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THE PHI LOSOPHY OF MIN D AND SOME 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS* 
by 
Jerome A. Shaffer 
The most basic problem in the Philosophy of Mind is, naturally enough, what a 
mind is. This question. so typical of philosophy in general, seems so simple and yet 
is extraordinarily difficult to answer. I wish, in this paper, to take a look at some of 
the attempts to answer this question and see if we can make out the general outlines 
of a satisfactory answer. 
Philosophy is d�vided into a number of fields, the philosophy of science. theory of 
knowledge. ethics, and so on. Usually philosophers specialize in one field or in a 
few fields, with the result that often there is no interaction between fields, no at­
tempts to evaluate the effects of i nquiry in one field or another field. I wish here to 
make a small allempl in that direction, to bring into some contact the philosophy of 
mind with another field of philosophy, ethics. I wish to see what ethical im­
plications, if any. there are for certain theses in the philosophy of mind. I will at­
tempt to show that certain doctrines in the philosophy of mind have unpalatable 
ethical consequences, and see what we are to make of that situation. 
Let us start with our question. what is a mind? Now this question is so abstract 
that it is very difficult to deal with it when it is put so baldly. To make our question 
more concrete and. thus, more manageable, I propose to tum our attention to some 
specific cases of the mental, to what I shall call mental events. Suppose, for 
example, that you are sitting around, and you suddenly have the thought that you 
have a class in a few moments. That thought flashes through your mind, as w e  say; 
it suddenly occurs lo you, dawns on you, or hits you. Your having of that thought is 
the kind of thing l would call a mental event. Or, to take a different sort of case, the 
having of a feeling : you suddenly feel a chill, or a surge of anger, or a sharp, 
stabbing pain. Here again we have what I would call a mental event. 
Now if we ask what a mental event is, one very popular answer over the ages has 
been materialism. the view that the only things in existence are material: matter in 
motion, atoms and the void. How would a materialist deal with mental events? 
There are two basic approaches which materialists have adopted, one which is 
usually called Behaviorism and the other which is usually called the Identity 
Theory (or Central State Materialism). The former consists in taking mental events 
to be particular kinds of behavior exhibited by particular kinds of material objects. 
Take pain, for example. The Behaviorist would claim that to be in pain is simply to 
behave under certain circumstances in certain sorts of ways, or at least be disposed 
to act in those ways. To say a person is in pain is to say he has a tendency to tum 
pale. writhe, cry out, etc. Part of this behavior is natural. Part of it is learned as is 
indicated by the familiar fact that cries of pain differ from one society to another. 
What of the report, "I am in pain"? Is this not a report of some inner, mental event? 
No, says the Behaviorist. This is just another kind of behavior, in this case, learned 
linguistic be havior. 
' All future publication rights reserved by the author. 
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Behaviorism has a certain plausibility when we consider it as a theory about 
other people. For when we say of someone else that he is in pain, the images that 
come to our mind and the observations we expect to make are those of a person 
crying out, writhing, etc. But it has seemed to most Teflective people that 
Behaviorism can hardly be applied to oneself. When I am in pain, I may very weU 
behave or be disposed to behave in certain ways. But I know in my own case that 
something much more is involved; namely, some sort of internal, non-behavioral 
event, which we call the having of pain. It is for this reason that Behaviorism has 
been abandoned. The only place where it can be found at all is in certain areas of 
experimental psychology. Even there, Behaviorism exists in a very watered-down 
version as a rule for guiding research, a rule which says that only what can be 
manifested in behavior should be studied by psychology. Since this is a rule for 
doing psychology, this view is often known as Methodological Behaviorism to 
distinguish it from the Behaviorism we have been discussing. The latter is 
sometimes called Logical Behaviorism. It is not a proposal about what should be 
investigated in psychology, but is a metaphysical claim aboult the ultimate nature of 
mental events themselves, namely, the claim that mental events are nothing but 
dispositions to behave in certain ways. 
A more plausible version of Materialism is that theory w!hicb is known today as 
the Identity theory. On this theory, mental events are identical with or nothing but 
bodily events, as it turns out, brain events. The essential feature of this theory 
concerns what is here meant by "identical." Other examples of this sort of "iden· 
tity" he:re intended would be the discovery that the Morning Star turned out to be 
identical with the Evening Star, that water turned out to be identical with H20, and 
that lightning turned out to be identical with a particular sort of electrical 
discharge. Such discoveries are empirical discoveries which for a long time 
remained unknown. Similarly, for mental events it is held that, although the 
identity of mental events with brain events was for a long rime unknown and still is 
not certain. it is at least fairly probable that they are identical. In this sense the 
Identity theory rests upon certain empirical results, and could be overthrown by 
new empirical results. The actual empirical results that this theory depends upon 
are certain very close correlations ·between mental events and brain events. The 
philosophical aspect of the theory is that it proposes that these correlations be 
taken in the same way as the correlations of Morning Star with Evening Star, water 
with H20. lightning with electrical discharges; that is to say, that they be taken as 
the discovery of identity. 
There are two objections which are currently being made to the Identity theory. 
Both seem to me to be conclusive objections .. ( 1 )  Brain events occur in a particular 
spatial location, whereas it is nonsensical to say that mental events occur in any 
particuJar spatial location. What would it mean to say that I bad just had a thought 
which occurred two inches behind the bridge of my nose, or that I had just had a 
sensation of fear midpoint between my ears, or that I had just had a sense-datum of 
a red patch two inches behind my eyeballs. Since it makes no sense to give mental 
events this sort of spatial location, they cannot be identical with events which do 
have that sort of spatial location, namely, brain events. So, the identitycannot hold. 
(2) Brain events are public events, in principle observable by anyone whatsoever, 
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whereas mental events are private events, in the sense that the person to whom a 
mental event occurs stands in a very special and privileged position with respect to 
that event. The special position is this: that if be firmly believes he has that mental 
event, then he cannot be mistaken in that belief, the belief must be correct. 
Necessarily. if a person firmly believes that he is feeling pain, then he is feeling 
pain. Here mental e\'ents differ from brain events. If a person firmly believes that 
he is undergoing some brain event, he may still be mistaken about it. Since mental 
events have this element of what is currently called "privileged access" and brain 
events lack this element, they cannot be identical. 
How are we to account for these two differences between mental and physical 
events? We postulate that they are separate and distinct events, both occurring in 
the same time series. perhaps, but the latter occurring in the spatio-temporal world 
while the former do not. This view seems quite plausible once the differences 
between the mental and the physical have been called to our attention. Imagine 
your being hit on the head in such a way that you have the visual experience we call 
"seeing stars." Now we would all agree that the blow to your skull is a purely 
physical event. It is clear that this has an effect on your brain, which involves 
various sorts of shakings and jarrings of various parts. This may lead to certain 
electrochemical changes in that part of your brain which is known as the visual 
cortex. All of this is physical in a perfectly straightforward way, and a physiologist 
might be familiar with the sorts of changes that might be going on. If your brain 
were magnified a thousand times. or if we had special high-powered microscopes, 
we might be able to observe au of these changes in great detail. But one thing we 
could not observe, and one thing which you arc directly aware of without having to 
make any observations through microscopes, etc., is that flash of color and light 
which we call "seeing stars." We may infer that that event took place, and you may, 
by your later behavior, indicate that it took place, but that particular event is a 
mental event and utterly different from any physical event we might observe. And 
no Materialistic theory , however ingeniously defended, will convince us otherwise. 
It looks as though we must admit the existence of mental events as something 
different from physical events. To admit this is to admit the need for some sort of a 
dualistic theory: that is, a theory which allows both mental events and physical 
events. We might note that Berkeley's Idealism, in allowing the mental but not the 
physical, is not dualistic. However, as we have seen, Idealism is in its own monistic 
way as implausible as the extreme Materialism is in its monistic way. 
Some philosophers have admitted the distinction between the mental and the 
physical but have held that each is simply a different aspect of some one underlying 
thing. Hence, such theories are sometimes called Double Aspect theories. The 
most famous Double Aspect theorist was Spinoza, who held that a man had two 
quite different aspects of himself, his physical and his mental aspect. The analogy is 
sometimes used of an undulating line, which al any particular time might be 
concave from one point of view and convex from the other point of view; each of 
these would be a different aspect of one and the same thing, namely, the line. 
Double Aspect theories have some serious difficulties. For one thing, there is the 
question of the nature of this underlying thing which has the two aspects. In 
Spinoza's case, it was extremely obscure. He called it "Substance," and he held that 
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Substance had infinitely many aspects, of which Lhe mental and the physical were 
Lhe only ones we knew. He also called it "God or Nature." How obscure this notion 
of Substance is can be brought out by the fact thal Lo this very day there is great 
controversy as to whether Spinoza was an atheist or, as a later commentator called 
him. "a God-intoxicated man." Another Double Aspect theorist. Herbert Spencer. 
put his cards on the table in referring to this underlying reality simply as "the 
Unknowable." In recent times, some philosophers have suggested that the un­
derlying unity might be taken to be "the person." But when one inquires. what a 
"person " is, it looks as though the most chat can be said is that it is the sort of thing 
which has both a physical and a mental aspect. And thfa puts us back at the 
beginning. so far as trying to find out what the underlying reality is. 
A second difficulty for a Double Aspect theory is to clarify the meaning of 
"aspect." In the case of the moving line which is convex and concave. it is quite 
clear what "aspect" means; it means spatial viewpoint or place from which the line 
is observed. But this simple sense, spatial viewpoin t, is not applicable to the un­
derlying reality of which the mental and the physical are sup[posed to be aspects, so 
it is not clear what "aspect" means in that case. Some contemporary philosophers 
suggest that we talk of the physical as the thing as seen "from the outside," and the 
mental as the thing as seen "from che inside." But presumably this is not meant to 
be taken li1erally. I am not sure how things would look from inside my brain, but 
presumably things would be pretty dark. to say the least. lC we are not to take "from 
the in ide" and "from the outside" lilerally, if we are to take these expressions in 
some metaphori�l way, then this scifi remains to be clarified. 
A third difficulty emerges if we turn our consideration to objects, such os rocks. 
Now, Spinoza held that rocks also had two aspects, a physical and a mental, as do 
all things in the universe. Spinoza thought that every physical entity had a 
corresponding mental aspect; this view is called ''Panpsychism." It has never struck 
very many philosophers as a plausible position. But what is the alternative? If we 
say that a rock is merely physical, then we will be committed to a basic difference 
between the bodies of things which also are thinking things and all other bodies. So 
far as conscious things are concerned, their being physical \Vi ll only be an aspect of 
someth�ng else. let us call it a "person." But in the case of a :rock, its being physical 
will be a basic characteristic of it. So rocks and persons are in principle quite 
diff erenl sorts of things. This has the result of treating the human body as 
something quite different from 01her bodies and, therefore, it would foJlow that we 
could not apply the same laws to both. We would then need two physical theories, 
one a physics concerning bodies proper, and the other, concerning the material 
aspect of persons. Such an asymmetry would be quite awkward for the develop· 
men t of natural science. 
We have considered various materialistic alltempts to identify mental events with 
materia l events, with either certain sorts of behavior of material objects or with 
particular sorts of evenls in those material objects. These theories have all had 
serious defects. It seems reasonable to think that mental events cannot be con­
strued as material. We must think of them as something separate and distinct from, 
something over and above, the body. U so, we are forced to raise two questions: 
How are these events related to the body, and how are they related to each other? 
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Three theories have gained prominence as accounts of how mental events are 
related to the body. The first of these, Epiphenomenalism, takes mental events to 
be mere by-products of bodily activity, particularly brain activity. This can be taken 
to be a Materialist theory in a somewhat extended sense of that term, since the 
claim is that the material world is the basic world, and that mental events are mere 
causal results of material changes. The French physician, Cabanis, gave expression 
to this view when he said chat brain secretes thought just as the liver secretes bile. 
Less pungent analogies that have been used by Epiphenomenalists are the 
relationship between a body and its shadow and between a steam locomotive and 
the steam that issues from its funnel. On this view, thoughts, sensations, sense-data, 
and the like have no effects on anything; they are mere consequences of what 
happens in the brain. 
A somewhat different theory is known as Interactionism. The lnteractionist 
admits that in many cases mental events are mere consequences of things that 
happen in the body. For example, when a trunk falls on my toe, the various changes 
that go into my body result in that mental event which we call pain. Again, when 
light reflected from the moon affects my visual system, there results the mental 
e\'ent we may call seeming to see the moon. To this extent, the lnteractionist agrees 
with the Epiphenomenalist. But the Interactionist bolds that in some cases at least 
mental events are able to produce effects on the body. Thus. he would hold that 
when a man winces from pain, the occurrence of the mental event which is the 
having of the pain affects the body in such a way as to produce the wince. Again, if 
I have a thought of which I am ashamed, this may cause my cheeks to tum that 
characteristic reddishness which we call blushing. Again, excessive worry may 
produce changes in the body which result in the pathological condition we refer to 
as ulcers. Descartes was an Interactionist, and he even had a theory of what part of 
the brain was the crucial point at which mental events and the brain interact. 
Because it was at the center of the brain, the pineal gland was chosen as the point of 
interaction; although there is no evidence that Descartes was right about this, to 
this very day the function of that particular part of the brain is still a mystery. 
One important way in which mental events are supposed to affect the body on 
the Interactionist theory is found in the case of volitions or acts of will. It is held 
thait when I make up my mind to do something, for example wink at the girl across 
the table from me, the mental event of deciding to wink has the effect of producing 
that particular facial change we call a wink. It is here that room is left for "free 
will," since no information about the body will be sufficient for us to be able to 
predict that the wink would occur. The cause of the wink is not some prior bodily 
state but a mental event. So the wink would be considered, from the point of view 
of the physical world alone, a random, i.e., uncaused, change. But, of course, it 
would ha"e a cause, namely, a mental cause. Someone who believed in "free will" 
might find this a reason for preferring the Interactionist theory. 
A third important theory in accounting for the relation between mental events in 
the body is Parallelism. The Parallelist repudiates the notion that there could be a 
causal connection between mental events and the brain. either going only from 
brain to mental events or going both ways. How could events so utterly dissimilar, 
he asks, possibly affect each other? Deciding that causal connection is impossible. 
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rhe Parallelist holds that every mental event is merely correlated with some 
physical e"ent in such a way that whene"er the one occurs tbe other occurs also. 
Leibniz offored the anaEogy of two perfect clocks which are so synchronized when 
they are constructed thac they remain forever in phase without any further ad­
justment. Thus, whenever one strikes midnight. the other strikes midnight. There is 
no causal connection, because each has its own inner works, but the states of each 
mechanism are always correlated with particular states of the other mechanism. 
Thus. to lake some of our earlier examples, whenever my brain is in that state 
produced by a trunk falling on my toe, then my mind is in the paraUel state of 
feeling pain; similarly, when my mind is in the state of having decided to wink at the 
girl across the table, my brain is always in the parallel state of starting the chain of 
events which will eventuate in my winking. 
So far as deciding between these three theories is concerned. I believe we can 
pretty easily eliminate the last of them, Parallelism. There does not seem to be any 
explanation to account for the constant conjunction of the mental and the physical. 
and to take it as a mere accident seems too farfetched to take seriously. But 
whether we incline towards Epiphenomenalism or lnteractionism depends upon 
whether or not we take the brain to be a relatively closed system whose changes 
can be hilly explained in terms of prior physical events. U we were to extrapolate 
from the recent history of physics, with its trend toward encompassing wider and 
\\ider ranges of phenomena. we might give the edge to EpipheoomenaJism. But if 
we hold that changes occur in the brain which cannot be explained in terms of prior 
physical events but which require the postulated interventjon of mental evencs, 
then we are opting for lnteractionism. The sad fact is that it is stiU too early to tell. 
We will just have to wait about a hundred years before ltbe outcome is more 
decidable. And if. at the end of that time, we still do not have a general theory of 
the brain which will, in principle, explain au, we still will not have settled the 
matter, for the Epiphenomenalist can still say we must continue to search for such a 
theory. Or he can say that some brain events just occur at random. So we cannot 
expect much in the way of decisiveness here, unless we do come upon a general 
theory of the brain which will explain all, in which case Epiphenomenalism will 
have triumphed. 
So far, we have seen that there exists a series of mental events, thoughts, sen­
sations, sense-data, and so forth, which are connected with the body, either 
causally or by regular correlarions. These mental events not only are related to the 
body, however; they are also related to each other. For it is correct to describe 
these mental events as all mental events of the same mind. It still remains for us to 
discuss lhe question, what the nature of the mind is, the /, which is the .subject of 
Descartes' "I think therefore I am." What is this "mind" that �I these mental events 
belong lo? One theory. going back to Plato, is that these mental events are events 
\\hich happen to one and the same. underlying, enduring nonphysical thing. This 
,·iew is often called the Memal Substance theory. It is the Mental Substance which 
allegedly undergoes the mental e\'ents and is related in some manner to the body. 
Ct is very bard to give any sense to this notion of a Mental Substance. H I look 
inwardly. and search the contents of my mind. I don't seem co find any such thing 
there. Nor could I find such a thing there, since all l can find are mental events and 
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this thing is presumably the lhing which is having the mental events. So it cannot be 
itself observed. Jt is the thing which thinks. And it seems that nothing more than 
that can be said. It seems doomed to lie in permanent obscurity, lurking in the 
background, never appearing. 
Because of the obscurities in the notion of a Mental Substance, some 
philosophers have been auracted to the view, first put in its modern form by Hume, 
that the mind is not some underlying thing which produces thoughts. but rather 
simply the bundle or collection of thoughts themselves. This theory is, therefore, 
sometimes called the Bundle theory of the mind. Your "mind" would simply be the 
collection of mental events you have had in your lifetime, and not some mysterious, 
underlying, unobservable thing. You are oot, of course, any particular mental event 
but the whole collection of them. Since the collection extends over time, so you 
extend over time. When the collection ceases to have new members added to it, 
that is to say when you cease having mental events, that will be the end of that 
collection, and so the end of you. 
This is a very attractive view, since it avoids the metaphysical obscurities of the 
Mental Substance theory. But there are some problems still to be worked out here. 
The main question is bow we are co describe the relations between these events 
which make them all members of one and the same collection. After all, there are 
many more mental events occurring in the world than those that go to make up 
your mind. By what right do we rule those others out as not being proper members 
of the collection that go to make up your mind? One suggestion is that the contents 
of each individual mind are related by memory. in the sense that if any particular 
mental event is a member of tlle collec1ion, then the collection will contain sub· 
sequent memories of the earlier mental events. This ns it stands is inadequate since 
tlhere are many mental events which I have which are never remembered later on. 
So we must say something like this: �bat an event is a member of a collection if it 
could be remembered later on. But now one problem here is che sense of the word 
"c0uld." For example, suppose that I have some unpleasant experience in my 
childhood which I have repressed, so that in some sense or other I ".cannot" 
remember it. �urely, this is not the relevant sense of "could." How about some of 
tlhc early experiences of my childhood which occurred when I was so young that no 
matter how hard I tried and no matter how much psychoanalysis I had and even 
perhaps no mauer bow much hypnosis or drugs I had, I still could not remember 
them? Would they still count as mental events in my mental life? And what is a 
memory, anyhow? Suppose it is simply a later mental state which resembles some 
earlier mental state and perhaps has the added feature of "this is familiar" or 
something like 1hat (as Hume held). Then we run into the following difficulty. Take 
the familiar experience of deja vue, the experience in which it all seems quite 
certain that we have been through this before, although it is unlikely we have. Now 
suppose someone else had had that experience before; presumably someone else 
has been in that room before. Then are we rememberhing his past experience? In 
which case his experience is a part of our mind. But that is absurd. So there are 
difficulties in the notion of memory here. At any rate, this is a matter with which 
the most recent philosophical work has concerned itself, and still nothing very clear 
has been forthcoming. Let me say that the Bundle theory does seem like the most 
reaso nable line of approach to try to work out. 
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Finally. one last account may be suggested. Some philosophers hold that lhe 
unity or the mind consists not in any relations between the mental evenilS them­
selves or in their relations to some mental substance but simply in their relationship 
to the body. Now, we do have a pretty clear idea of what it is for a body to be one 
and the same body for some length of time. Of course. it is not exactly the same: I 
don'L have exactly the same body I had ten years ago or even ten minutes ago. But 
we have some idea of what we mean when we say it is the same body, namely a 
certain continuity of change and a certain relatively unchangeableness. So why not 
say that a series of events belongs to the same mind, if all of these events are 
connected with the same body? The exact form of the connection would depend 
upon which theory we accepted of the relationship between mind and body. That 
is, we might say they were the mental events of the same mind if they were the 
effects of or correlated with one and the same particular brain. Thus. we would be 
able to find the unity of these mental events in their being related to a single en­
during physical body. Such an account has seemed very attractive to philosophers, 
because we then do not have to seek the unity of the mind in some mysterious 
mental substance, nor do we have to face the baffling problem of specifying the 
relations between mental events which make them events of the same mind. We 
already know abom the body and its relative unity, so that it becomes convenient to 
use the body as our peg on which to tie the bundle of mental events. 
This attractive theory has the following consequence, however, which we must 
go on to discuss: It has the consequence that it rules out and renders utterly 
meaningless two possibilities, the possibility that the mind might continue co exist 
after the death of the body and the possibi lity that the mind might move from one 
body to another. Since each mind gains its existence as a unity from its connection 
with some particular body, it no longer can ex:ist as a unity when that connection is 
severed. So the very notion of a mind existing without that particular connection to 
that body is unintelllgible. To say that Jones' body was destroyed but his mind 
continued to exist would be to contradict oneself, since Jones' mind is defined as 
those mental events connected with particular events in his body. 
But the notion of survival of the self after the death of the body is not unin­
telligible or self-contradictory. You can imagine the following situation, namely, 
witnessing your own funeral. Imagine that you suddenly have a terrible pain in your 
chest. ev1erything grows dim, and then there is blackness. The next thfog you know 
you are presented with a scene in which a body which looks very much like yours is 
sprawled on the floor. People are rushing around, calling for doctors, wringing their 
hands and shouting your name. Finally, after a lot of confusion, the doctor stands 
over the body, shakes his head, and says, "I have done my best but he is gone now." 
You see and bear all of this from whal seems 110 be a point near the ceiling, but you 
get no visual appearances of your own body directly beneath that point nor do you 
ha' e any of the bodily sensations you usually have. You find yourself having all 
i.orts of thoughts and emotions. and finally che thought flashes through your mind 
that you are dead. But, remembering Descartes, you quickly uller a few Cogitos 
and pro,-e that, although your body is dead and you no longer are connected with 
it. nevertheless you still exist. 
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Do such things happen? Well, it must be admitted that we do not really know 
whether they happen or not. We have shown that it is not self-contradictory to 
assert that they happen but whether they do or not is an empirical question. My 
own view is that they most probably do not occur. The evidence I would cite is the 
already known intimacy of connection between mental events and brain events. 
We know thal when certain parts of the brain are damaged this produces a 
pathological mental condition and, if particular parts of the brain are totally 
destroyed, there may well be a total loss of mental function of a particular sort. All 
of this makes it likely, by inductive extrapolation, that when the brain is totally 
destroyed the mind is destroyed with it. However, this sort of empirical argument is 
not as yet very strong. There are enormous numbers of things we are in ignorance 
about concerning the brain and its correlated mental functions. We know that large 
portions of the brain can be affected (and even removed) with hardly any 
noticeable difference in mental functioning. We know that in some cases of brain 
damage there is temporary loss of mental functioning which then. astonishingly 
enough, is regained. Even memories lost on removal of a part of the brain may 
come back again in time. So any arguments about the degree of correlation of mind 
and brain based upon pres em knowledge is not going to be very strong. It is entirely 
conceivable that when the brain is destroyed, in death, there is a temporary loss of 
mental functioning. but not a permanent one. So survival of the mind after the 
death of the body still remains to some degree an open question. 
Let us briefly consider the possibility of transmigration, the movement of the 
mind or self from one body to another. Let us see if we can imagine a case. Suppose 
two men are pruning a tree, and the tree is suddenly hit by lightning. Both men are 
knocked unconscious and, when they come to, each with great astonishment cries 
out that his body is a completely different one from rthe one he used to have. We 
find that from each body issue forth claims about the past of the other and 
knowledge of faces which only the other person could have had. We also find a 
complete exchange of personality traits. If this exchange were carried out in 
complete detail, would we not be inclined to say in such cases, despite the 
irreglllarity of it all, that the two persons had somehow exchanged bodies? I think 
we would. So transmigration also is not self-contradictory. So far as the question 
whether it ever occurs is concerned, here I should think it is almost certain that it 
never has occurred. In the few cases where it was claimed to have happened (for 
example, the "Bridey Murphy" case), more plausible explanations, have always 
been found, such as repressed memories, hysterical changes of personality, and 
even fraud. So while transmigration of thls sort remains a possibility, it almost 
certainly never happens. Still it is not self-contradictory or unintelligible to say that 
it has happened, and that shows that if someone presents a good deal of evidence 
that it has happened we are obliged to consider the matter with care. 
What the possibility of such cases does show is that the unity of the mind cannot 
be located in the unity of the body. They show that, in Descartes' words, "it is 
certain that this I is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body. and can exist 
whhout it" (sixth Meditation). This forces us back to the earlier question, What is 
this 1 or self which can exist separately from the body? It seems so simple and 
transparent and unquestionable to be able to say, "I think, therefore I am." Such a 
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statement may well be Lrue, perhaps even cenain. but its sense may well be ex­
traordinarily difficult. 
So far "e ba' e been considering some of the ba ic problems in the philosophy of 
mind. Now I "ish to turn to some related matters m the field of ethics. that field of 
philosophy which treats of right and wrong, good and bad, praise and blame, 
reward and punishment, the moral and immoral, the ethical and unethical. For our 
purposes, we need to take a typically moral judgment about which there would be 
comparatively little disagreement among us, one that most of us would find wholly 
acceptable. I think that the following will do: it is intriflsically wrong to inflict great 
pain on a11otheragainst his will for the fun of ii. To make this judgment appeal to as 
many as possible, I specify that the pain must be groat (since some might believe 
that there is nothing wrong if the pain is minor and the fun enormous, perhaps in 
certain practical jokes or teasings). that it must be against his will (since some might 
believe that inflicting pain on a masochist. who welcomes it, is not wrong), and that 
it must be just for the fun of ir (since there may well be cases in which it is not 
wrong to inflict great pain on another against his will if there are very good reasons 
to do so - for example. it may be necessary in order lo save his life). Finally, I am 
thinking of an act that is instrinsical/y wrong. that is, wrong in itself and not wrong 
because of any further consequences of the act. lf the judgment is understood with 
thc�e po111ts in mind, I wouJd think that the \3Sl majority would accept the 
1u<lgmcn t as true. 
It i another matter. and a terribly difficult matter, how we know the judgment to 
be true. It is so simple and basic a judgment that it 1s unlikely that it could be 
deduced from some other judgment or judgments; and, even if it could be so 
deduced. that wouJd just leave us with exactly the same problem, how do we kn.ow 
the judgment or judgments from which it is deduced? The theist might say we know 
11 to be true because God tells us it is true. But how do we know God really tells us 
it is true? And, more important, so what? Suppose some supematu�al being told us 
it was all right to inflict great pain for the fun of it? We wound say that such a being 
was evil! In other words, we already know the judgment to be true and would not 
call a supernatural bei11g "God" unless that being also assented to the judgment. 
Perhaps the best that can be said for the j udgment is thal it is self-evident. If by 
this is meant, however. that anyo11e who considered it would assent to it, then it 
must be admitted that it might well 11ot be self-evident to everyone. There are 
people. sadists for example. who do inflict pain for the fun of it: and, while some of 
them might admit it was wrong of them to do so. others might see nothing wrong in 
11 and we might nor be able to succeed in persuading them that there was anything 
"rong in it. Suppose we said. "How would you like us to do it to you?" The sadist 
might admit that he wouJd not like that nt all. but still claim that there was nothing 
wrong m it. Cl might not like you to beat me at tennis. but I could not say it would 
be .,·rong of you lo beat me at tennis.) So we cannot ay that such a judgment would 
'ecm self-e, idently true to everyone. Now the sadist is usually thought to be suf­
fering from an illness, a behavior disorder - he is a psychopath. So the best we 
could say, and perhaps not even this is true, is that the judgment is self-evident to 
any normal person. But now we would still need a definition of "normal" which 
doe'I not invoh e begging the question by calling someone abnormal just because he 
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does not rind such judgments self-evidently true. And that is not easy to provide. 
The above considerations concern the question how we know the judgment that 
it is wrong to inflict pain for the fun of it. From the fact that it is very difficult to say 
how we know, it does not follow that we do not know. It seems to me that we do 
know this judgment to be true, even if we cannot say how we know it. Imagine 
someone inflicting considerable pain on a child just for the fun of it - isn't it so 
dear and obvioi1s, can't you just see that it is wrong? I think we do indeed have 
here a moral judgment that would gain the assent of most readers, despite the 
epistemological difficulties involved. 
Now to consider the relevance of such a judgment to metaphysics. Earlier we 
considered some theories concerning the nature of such mental events as the 
feeling of pain. One such theory was labeled "Materialism", the view that all events 
in nature are physical (atoms and the void) and that so-called mental events are, 
therefore, nothing but purely physical occurrences. On the view called 
Behaviorism. they are items of physical behavior or dispositions toward such items 
of behavior; on rthe Identity theory, they are brain events, the firings of neural cells, 
waves of electrical energy, or the like. 
Now let us consider our moral judgment concerning pain in the light of these 
materialistic theories. For Behaviorism. a feeling of pain would be the exhibiting, 
under the appropriate circumstances, of pain-behavior: groans, grimaces, paleness 
of face, clenching of the teeth, writhings, etc. Our moral judgment would come to 
chis - that it is intrinsically wrong to induce in another person groans, grimaces, 
etc., just for the fun of it. 
But is the judgment true under the Behaviorist�c interpretation ? I, for one, 
cannot see that it is. What is wrong about inducing that sort of behavior in another? 
Of course, one might hold that it is wrong to induce any sort of behavior in another 
against his will just for the fun of it. But that would be a different principle. 
although one which would also conrmand the assent of most of us. But the principle 
we are concerned with holds that it is particularly wrong to induce groans, 
grimaces, etc. And I do not believe that this is the case. To see this, consider giving 
our victim curare prior to torture. A sufficient dose of curare leaves a person fully 
couscious and able to feel everything - but, temporarily, completely paralyzed 
and unable to respond behaviorally. On the behavioristic account, we can erase the 
wrongness of the act by administering curare before tightening the thumb screws or 
turning on the ,electricity. If what is intrinsically wrong is eliciting that behavior, 
l hen the use of curare would make everything all right. But, of course, it does not. 
For it is not the dispositions to behavior which are intrinsically undesirable. [f that 
is all there were to pain, our moral judgment would not be true. If our judgment is 
1rue, there must be more to pain than the behavior to which we are disposed. If 
Behaviorism is true, our moral judgment loses its validity. Our moral principle and 
Behaviorism cannot both be true (though they could both be false). Which are we 
to give up? 
Even if we did not have our prior arguments against Behaviorism, I believe we 
would accept the moral principle and reject Behaviorism, if forced to choose 
between the two. The moral principle seems intuitively quite certain and un­
deniable, whereas Behaviorism has a considerably lower degree of likelihood. If 
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forced to choose, it is reasonable to pick the more likely one. 
Do :similar considerations apply to the Identity theory? Iii. would seem so, but it is 
not as clear a matter in this case. On the Identity theory, our moral principle comes 
to this, that it is intrinsically wrong to produce certain events in a man's brain. Put 
that way. the principle is certainly no longer obvious or self-evident. It is even 
doubtful whether it is true. Many of those who accept the original principle as true 
wouldl reject this principle as false. 
But now the ldencicy theorist would claim that it is because of our ignorance of 
the identity that we would accept the original principle yet reject the Identity 
version of it. After all, he would argue, if infliction or pain is wrong allld pain is 
identical with stimulation of a particular part of the brain, then that stimulation is 
wrong. 
One might grant the Identity theorist this logical point, but still question his line 
of reasoning. Does he not beg the question? The logical point is relevant on the 
assumption that we already know the identity. But we are trying to decide whether 
there is an identity of brain states and mental states. We can appeal to the fact that 
pain bas a moral undesirability whereas the corresponding brain state does not 
have this moral undesirability; chis fact, ii it is a fact, would show that pain and the 
brain :slate are not identical. And when we add this argument against the two most 
popular forms of materialism, BebaviorLc;m and the Identity theory, to chose 
considered earlier, we have even more reason to reject it. It would seem, then, that 
some form of dualism is the most plausible view to take. There is more to nature 
than matter in motion. There is also the mind.1 
1 Parts. Of Ill is are reprinted from the author's REALITY. KNOWLEDGE AN 0 VALUE. New York. Random 
House. Inc .• 1971 
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